Bergen Philosophy of Science Workshop 2015
The annual department workshop in the philosophy of science will take place 4-5 June 2015. Everyone welcome, no registration needed.
Main content
Philosophy of science goes through exciting times nowadays. The intention of this workshop is to make available to us the best work of some of the best philosophers of science and mathematics in the world. While technicalities may sometimes be unavoidable, the speakers ill try to do their best to keep the presentations at an accessible level, so everyone should feel welcome to attend. No registration needed.
Program
Thursday 4 June
Thursday 4 June
13.55
Welcome from the Chair of the Dept., Prof. Reidar Lie
14.00 – 15.00
Mark Steiner (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem)
The Silent Revolution of Wittgenstein in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1937
15.15 –16.15
Catherine Wilson (York Univ.)
The 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness: Scientific Explanation and Philosophical Ineffability
16.30 – 17.45
Juha Saatsi (Leeds Univ.)
Emergence and Explanation
19.00 Conference dinner
Friday 5 June
Friday 5 June
9.30 - 10.30
Mary Leng (York Univ.)
Mathematical Realism and Naturalism
10.45 – 11.45
Anjan Chakravartty (Notre Dame Univ.)
Property Ontology in Fundamental Physics
11.45 – 12.15 Lunch on site
12.15 – 13.15
Oystein Linnebo (Univ. of Oslo)
Mathematics and Inference to the Best Explanation
13.15 Farewell
Abstracts
Abstracts
Anjan Chakravartty (Univ. of Notre Dame)
Property Ontology in Fundamental Physics
I explore different conceptions of the ontological nature of properties as described in fundamental physics – more specifically, in the context of the Standard Model of particle physics. The theory itself describes the relevant properties (like mass, charge, and spin) simply as invariants of certain mathematical, symmetry group transformations, but this by itself leaves their ontology largely unspecified. Some think that symmetry principles suggest a kind of structural ontology. Others think that these properties are better described in terms of an ontology of dispositions. I consider the contrasting motivations for these markedly opposed conceptions of fundamental ontology.
Mary Leng (York Univ.)
Mathematical realism and naturalism
The label "Naturalism" is used to cover a range of philosophical views, some of which ('naturalism as physicalism') apparently speaking against mathematical realism, and others ('naturalism as scientific realism') apparently speaking in favour of realism about mathematical objects. In the context of the debate over the indispensability of mathematics in empirical science, it is widely assumed that Quine's naturalism implies scientific realism, which in turn implies mathematical realism (if mathematics is indispensable). Granting the indispensability of mathematics, debate over mathematical realism then transfers to whether elements of the Quinean picture hold together (e.g., Maddy's objection that Quine's naturalist trust of science is in tension with his insistence on confirmational holism). But even setting these (real or apparent) tensions aside, there remains a question of whether Quine's naturalism is really compatible with the "robust realism" he claims to uphold. This paper will question whether Quine's naturalism packs the ontological punch required by those Platonists who appeal to the indispensability argument to support their realism.
Øystein Linnebo (Univ. of Oslo)
Mathematics and inference to the best explanation
The method of "inference to the best explanation" is frequently invoked, not only in the empirical sciences but also in the philosophy of mathematics. After reviewing some appeals to this method in the philosophy of mathematics, I examine the conditions under which the method is justified. This examination calls into question the potential of the method as a way of justifying new mathematical axioms.
Juha Saatsi (Leeds Univ.)
Emergence and Explanation
In this talk I explore some arguments for (ontological, strong) emergence in the light of currently popular accounts of scientific explanation. Amongst the various arguments for emergence there are some that explicitly turn on the idea that any purportedly reductive theory is bound to be explanatorily incomplete. After discussing these arguments in general terms, I will focus more specifically on the explanatory indispensability of infinite limits in renormalisation group explanations of universality (as discussed by Batterman, Menon and Callender, and others).
Mark Steiner (Hebrew Univ. Jerusalem)
The Silent Revolution of Wittgenstein in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1937
Sometime in in late 1930’s, Wittgenstein embarked on a new direction in the philosophy of mathematics. This “silent revolution,” as I call it, involved how Wittgenstein viewed the relation between mathematics and its applications to the world. By studying Wittgenstein’s notebooks, whichtrack his philosophical and personal development, we can see when and where this revolution took place—in August, 1937, about 4 hours from this conference. The revolution was accompanied by great turmoil for Wittgenstein—intel
lectual, psychological, and even sexual.
Catherine Wilson (York Univ.)
The 'hard problem' of Consciousness: scientific explanation and philosophical ineffability
David Chalmers follows a long line of metaphysician s, going back perhaps to Leibniz with his 'mill' argument, who argue that consciousness cannot be explained by the
natural sciences. This stance leads him to the conclusion that thermostats and other non-animals may have some form of awareness. To a biologist this supposition is absurd, and many neuroscientists do feel they are making progress on the hard problem What does this standoff suggest about the relationship of these two disciplines, one apparently focused on possible worlds, the other on reality?
