In search of the correct intentional Objects of emotions

In the philosophy of emotion it is commonly assumed that a formal object is an essential element in the intentional structure of emotions: It is claimed to make an emotion intelligible and allow for the assessment of an emotion’s appropriateness. However, when examining the occurrence of emotions in social contexts and the social functions they serve there, it becomes evident that the formal object cannot fulfill those roles usually ascribed to it. More specifically, it will be argued that the formal object, although, arguably, sufficient for making an emotion intelligible by type-identifying it, is not a necessary element in the explanation of an emotion’s intentionality. Furthermore, the formal object is inapt for assessing the appropriateness of emotions in social contexts. The reason for this, so my diagnosis, is that the formal object, as it is currently conceived of, can only capture emotions’ mind-to-world direction of fit, whereas emotions’ intentionality is characterized by an inherent world-to-mind direction of fit.

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