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Ole Thomassen Hjortland | Disagreement about logic | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Disagreement about logic
Ole Thomassen Hjortland
What do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it, classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the nature of logical properties. Yet, sometimes the parties are accused of talking past each other. The worry is that if the parties to the dispute do not mean the same thing with ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, they fail to have genuine disagreement about the laws in question. After the work of Quine, this objection against genuine disagreement about logic has been called the meaning-variance thesis. We argue that the meaning-variance thesis can be endorsed without blocking genuine disagreement. In fact, even the type of revisionism and nonapriorism championed by Quine turns out to be compatible with meaning-variance.
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of logic, nonclassical logic, meaning-variance, disagreement, Quine