'Standing above a Wrong'
Stefan Riedener (Associate Professor in Philosophy, UiB) holder innlegg i Gruppen for praktisk filosofi 17. november, kl. 15.15.
There are many familiar reasons why you might not blame someone who wronged you: you may think they aren’t culpable, or believe you lack the standing to blame them, or you might forgive them. But there’s another phenomenon, which has received little attention so far: you might simply stand above the fact that they wronged you. In this paper, I examine what this attitude is, and when (if ever) we should adopt it. I suggest you stand above a wrong if you don’t care about it as a ground for blame—partly because you don’t care about the wrongdoer as a moral agent, and partly because you care about something more care-worthy. I argue that that’s appropriate if and only if the wrongdoer’s culpably wronging you isn’t important in your relationship to them. Our phenomenon thus implicates large questions about the import of interpersonal relations. More generally, it suggest that to live well is to tread rightly on the path between immersion and violability on the one hand, and self-sufficiency, independence and composure on the other.
Participants are expected to read the paper in advance of the seminar as there will be no presentation. If you would like a copy of the paper, please email firstname.lastname@example.org.