Bergen Logic Seminar: Logical Pluralism and the Mixed Inference Problem

Abstract

According to domain-specific logical pluralism (DLP), there are distinct correct logics for different domains. Thus, contrary to what logical monism proposes, there is no one logic best suited to evaluate the validity of arguments across all domains. DLP, however, is at a disadvantage compared with its monist competitor, for it provides an incomplete account of validity for those arguments containing propositions from diverse domains governed by distinct logics. While recognised in the literature, this mixed inference problem has yet to receive the attention it deserves. This paper clarifies the problem for advocates of DLP, and shows that the solutions available in the literature up to this point are insufficient. However, we argue that if DLP were to be justified via logical abductivism, the theory that logics are chosen according to their ability to best accommodate certain relevant data, then a principled and ready solution is available to the problem.