

15th, tuesday

Schedule

9:15 - 10:00

João Daniel Dantas

Could the Geach-Kaplan Sentence be Expressed in a First-Order Language?

10:00 - 10:45

Jonathan Mai

Much Ado About the Many

11:00 - 12:15

Daniel Durante

No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility

13:30 - 14:15

Sanderson Molick

Logical Revision from an Anti-exceptionalist Point of View

14:15 - 15:00

Christos Kyriacou

Beyond Logical Revision: Logical Fixed Points, Theoretical Indispensability and Explanatory Value

15:15 - 16:00

Evelyn Erickson

Logic as a Research Program

16:00 - 16:45

Ludovica Conti

Metaphysical Assumptions in Russell's Paradox

17:00 - 18:30

Peter Verdée

Beliefs Supporting Other Beliefs: Truthmaker Semantics for Logic-neutral Inference in Hyperintensional Webs of Belief

16th, wednesday

9:15 - 10:00

Topey Brett

Logical Realism and Logical Reliability

10:00 - 10:45

Éno Agolli

Logical Nihilism

11:00 - 11:45

Silvia Bianchi

Metaphysical Grounding in Scientific Weak Structuralism (WS): a Non-Foundationalist Perspective

13:30 - 14:45

Michaela Mcsweeney

Anti-Exceptionalism and Metaphysics

15:15 - 16:00

Luca Zanetti

Cognitive Phenomenology and the Epistemology of Logic