

**Anat Biletzki: “Militaristic Women: The Odd Case of Israeli Feminism”:**

This article has two backdrops: one is the theoretical divide between liberal feminism and radical feminism on the question of women in the military; the other is the concrete historical, social, political and legal story of women in the military in Israel. The basic question, of whether women’s equality in the army is a feminist achievement or is rather their appropriation into a hierarchical, patriarchal framework which is inimical to feminism, will receive a tangible illustration through the account of how women in Israel – the only country in the world where female conscription is mandatory – have “succeeded” in the army. This rights-oriented legal accomplishment will be problematized, however, by its counterpart – the parallel phenomenon of women in the Israeli peace camp who have claimed a right-to-refuse (to serve in the military). The relative popularity of the militaristic option as compared with the marginality of conscientious objection, even in the case of girls who have had a progressive upbringing, will be interrogated and found to be paradoxical. The construct of Israeli feminism itself must subsequently be questioned – in essence and in practice.

**Gro Rørstadbotten: “Thinking Change: A dynamic 'utopian approach”:**

Given the main theme of the conference – Human Rights and Peace – I’ll argue that within this context there is today an urgent need for thinking change. But how do we *think change*? In this regard my point of departure is to display various views on, and different approaches to, the concept of “peace”. This elaboration leads towards the concept of “self-determination” which, as a political aim, has become a fundamental right which stems from the catalogue of human rights. From this generated perspective the urge for thinking change will be highlighted by creating an encounter between the Western theoretician of “sexual difference”, Luce Irigaray, and the Eastern peace- and environment activist, Vandana Shiva. The closing argument in my paper is that for being able to think a peaceful future, peace cannot be an aim – but a way of *doing*; and for being able to *do*, we need a dynamic “utopian” approach towards...

**Petra Hedberg: “On the validity of human rights”:**

To what extent are the human rights justifiable? This is the central question in this context. Here, two different strategies will be at stake. Habermas’ weaker, so-called reconstructive approach will be contrasted with Apel’s stronger, reflexive, one. The human rights are, on the one hand, capable of being reconstructed on basis of the modernization process, and on basis of those democratic ideals that were central to this process. They are also capable of being justified apart from historical and political processes of democratization. The two philosophers agree on this point, but differ in one important respect. Habermas resorts to a mainly discursive, justificatory, strategy: the human rights are to be justified within the ongoing human rights debates. Apel, on the contrary, resorts to a reflexive type of strategy, by also appealing to a criterion of consistency/coherency. There are certain meta-norms that the human rights cannot do without. The ideas of individual autonomy, of equal rights, and the need to, mutually, respect the rights of one another, are vital to the system of human rights. To what extent these meta-norms are justifiable, is one of the central questions. And how these meta-norms relate to specific human rights, is another one.

### Abstrakt:

I hvor sterk grad lar seg menneskerettighetene begrunne og rettferdiggjøre? Dette er det sentrale spørsmålet i denne sammenheng. To forskjellige strategier vil bli vurdert. Habermas' svakere, såkalte rekonstruktive tilnærming settes i kontrast til Apels sterkere, «refleksive» tilnærming. Menneskerettighetene er, på den ene side, rekonstruerbare på grunnlag av historiske prosesser som moderniseringsprosessen, og de demokratiske idealer som stått sentralt i denne prosessen. De to filosofene er enige så langt, men avviker fra hverandre på et viktig punkt. Habermas legger til grunn en hovedsakelig diskursiv begrunnelsesstrategi: Menneskerettighetene lar seg kun begrunne innenfor de til enhver tid gjeldende menneskerettighetsdebatter. Apel vil, tvert imot, ta utgangspunkt i en refleksiv begrunnelsestype, der man også appellerer til et konsistenskriterium/koherensskriterium. Tanken er at det finnes bestemte meta-normer som menneskerettighetene ikke klarer seg foruten: Ideer om individuell autonomi, om like rettigheter, og behovet for at individene også respekterer hverandres rettigheter, er ideer som står sentralt i systemet av menneskerettigheter. Hvordan og i hvor sterk grad disse lar seg begrunne, er et av spørsmålene i denne sammenheng. Og hvordan disse meta-normene relateres til spesifikke menneskerettigheter, er et annet.