#### **DNV-GL**



**ENERGY** 

# Prosumers and distributed energy resources: New challenges for network tariffs

**Energy Lab: Efficient and Sustainable Electricity Markets** 

Jørgen Bjørndalen

13 September 2017

A global classification, certification, technical assurance and advisory company


**OUR PURPOSE** 

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
## TO SAFEGUARD LIFE, PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

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
#### An energy technology powerhouse




## **DNV GL's Energy Transition Outlook 2017**












#### Changing properties and behavior: What is the impact for efficient pricing?


- Current tariffs for normal end users
- What are the new features of demand
- Cost structure for provision of network serv
- Tariff design: Lessons from theory
- Implications for actual tariff design



#### **Building blocks of most network tariffs**

- Annual fee €/year
  - Equal to all customers, or equal for all similar customers but varying between categories of customers
- Capacity fee €/kW [€/kWh/h]
  - Annual or monthly payment depending on actual or subscribed capacity per year or month
  - Equal (in €/year) for small customers
    - Decreasing rate (€/kW) for metered customers
- Energy fee €/kWh
  - Payment depending on energy used (or supplied) per month/quarter/...
- Taxes €/whatever
  - Per kWh is perhaps the most common format

## **Typical tariff structure**



#### Different network bills for similar network connections

NOK 5 000 per year

NOK 15 000 per year





#### **Key features of typical future grid customers**

- Reduced energy demand/use per task
- Increased capacity use per task
- Prosumers



27 kW water heater – for residential use






- Ability to manage electricity use
  - Automatically based on algorithms and sensors and/or price signals




 Current 'reward' for prosumers is far higher than cost reductions in the grid

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## **Cost structure of electricity networks**



## **Determinants of capex+opex**



#### Two important lessons from economic theory

#### **Pricing rule**

Ensure efficient utilisation



#### **Investment rule**

Facilitate efficient expansion







#### So what is the marginal cost of providing grid services?

- Sufficient capacity
  - Marginal cost = marginal network losses
    - Network losses ≈ 6 % [2015]
    - Average marginal loss ≈ 12 %
      - Varies between ALL grid customers
      - Varies from negative to positive
      - May reach 40-50 % at remote buildings in scarcely populated areas
- Insufficient capacity
  - TSO-level: Incorporated in energy prices
  - DSO-level: Not very common (yet)



Photo: ABB

## Why is insufficient capacity at DSO-level so rare?

driftssikkerheten bli redusert. Å være tidlig ute med investeringene kan ses på som en forsikringsbetaling mot ulempene ved underkapasitet. På den andre siden er ulempen ved å investere for tidlig unødvendig høye kostnader i nettet. Disse

White paper about network policy; St.mld. 14 (2011-2012), p. 56 (Investing ahead of demand is an insurance payment against disadvantages of insufficient capacity)


- Life time considerations
  - 50-70 years technical lifetime and low marginal cost of capacity at time of investment
- Cost optimisation: losses vs. capex and opex?
  - Capacity is not an important cost driver
- High loads are short-lived
  - kW is not the same as kWh/h
    - kWh/h: thermal capacity limit
    - kW: voltage quality
  - Dimensioning for high thermal capacity results in much higher instantaneous capacity
- Manageable unit of time has been hour, not seconds or minutes
  - This is currently changing (IoT, AI, etc.)


#### **Implications for pricing**

- Marginal cost of using the grid (the energy fee)
  - Might account for 15-20 % of regulated revenue
- How to cover the rest?
  - Equal payment for all customers?
  - Equal payment per kWh?
  - Equal payment per kW?
  - Payment according to elasticity of demand?
  - Let other grid customers pay?
  - Send the bill to the state?
  - Localisation signal (=approach to LRMC)?
    - Or 'equalisation'?
- Residual fee similar to tax collection; avoid distortion
  - Minimum impact on short term utilisation



#### **Implications for grid expansion**






- A low energy fee encourages increased use, without signalling the cost of expansion
  - SRMC < LRMC
    - Will be the case at DSO level
      - Despite SmartGrid, IoT, etc.?
- Network companies are obliged to connect new customers
  - Connection charges apply for customer specific costs only
    - Costs in meshed grids not chargeable (by regulation)
- How to mitigate increased demand for capacity?
  - ..., if tariffs should be equal across the country?
    - …, or at least within the DSO area?

#### Combining fairness, adequate investment signals, and efficient use

- A (highly) variable energy fee
  - Depending on energy price and marginal losses
  - But what about granularity?
    - End-user vs. substation vs. transmission node?
    - Second/minute/hour/day/week/ month/season/year?
- A fixed annual residual fee
  - Depending on customer size (capacity demand)
    - Metered?
    - Installed?
    - Subscription?
  - Depending on location?
    - Substation, DSO-area or larger zones?



Source: Retail tariff, Eidsiva Energi Nett



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