

**Conference Program for Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind, and Naturalism  
June 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup>, Faculty of Law (Dragefjellet), University of Bergen, Room S2**

**June 12<sup>th</sup>**

- 10:30 AM Coffee
- 10:45 AM Welcome
- 11:00 AM Bjørn Ramberg (Oslo) “Do Pragmatic Naturalists Have Souls?”  
(Commentator Nivedita Gangopadhyay)
- 12:15 PM Lunch
- 1:15 PM Paper Sessions 1 & 2 (see below for details)
- 3:30 PM Coffee
- 3:45 PM Julia Tanney (Kent) “Rational Animals”  
(Commentator Stina Bäckström)
- 5:00 PM Coffee
- 5:15 PM Bill Child (Oxford) “Sensations, Natural Properties & The Private  
Language Argument” (Commentator Thomas Raleigh)
- 6:45 PM Annual Meeting of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society  
Faculty of Law (Dragefjellet), University of Bergen, Room S2

**June 13<sup>th</sup>**

- 9:30 AM Paul Snowdon (UCL) “A Defence of Wittgenstein’s Naturalism”  
(Commentator Sorin Bangu)
- 10:45 AM Coffee
- 11:00 AM Charles Travis (Kings College) “The Room in a View”  
(Commentator Anat Biletzki)
- 12:15 PM Lunch
- 1:15 PM Paper Sessions 3 & 4 (see below for details)
- 3:30 PM Coffee
- 3:45 PM Dorit Bar-On (Connecticut) “Minding the Gap: In Defense of Mind-  
mind Continuity” (Commentator Mette Hansen)
- 5:00 PM Coffee
- 5:15 PM Jonathan Knowles (NTNU) Representationalism, Metaphysics and  
Naturalism: Price versus Horwich” (Commentator Paal Antonsen)

## Paper Sessions

### Session 1:

1:15 PM Pierre Steiner (Compiègne Technology University) "Wittgenstein and 4E Cognitive Science: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back"

2:00 PM Ian O'Loughlin (Pacific University) "Unraveling Amnesia: Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Memory Impairment"

2:45 PM Tony Cheng (Berkeley) "Self-Identification, Somatoparaphrenia, and Wittgenstein"

### Session 2:

1:15 PM Benedict Smith (Durham) "Wittgenstein, Naturalism and Scientism"

2:00 PM Stephen Burwood (Hull) "Wittgenstein, Naturalism and Conceptual Change"

### Session 3:

1: 15 PM Eugen Fischer (East Anglia) "Wittgenstein for Experimentalists"

2:00 PM Christopher Hoyt (Western Carolina University) "Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion"

2:45 PM Krzysztof Poslajko (Jagiellonian University) "Can There be Expressivism about Folk Psychology?"

### Session 4:

1:15 PM Tamara Dobler (East Anglia) "On the Occasion-Sensitivity of Thoughts: Fodor vs Travis"

2:00 PM Jordan Rodgers (King's College) "A Response to Balog and Papineau's Criticism of the Private Language Argument"

2:45 PM Thomas Raleigh (NTNU) "Wittgenstein, Craig, and Other Minds"

## Abstracts for Invited Papers

### “Representationalism, Metaphysics and Naturalism: Price versus Horwich”

Jonathan Knowles, NTNU

Both Huw Price and Paul Horwich, in different ways, see themselves as anti-representationalists and anti-metaphysicians, views that they also see as inspired by or as having affinities with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. They differ, or would appear to, with respect to the question of naturalism, Price subscribing to it in a modified form, Horwich apparently rejecting it. In this paper I examine what these commitments amount to for the respective philosophers, critically discuss the overall views they enunciate, and finally present my own assessment of (the interrelationships between) representationalism, metaphysics and naturalism.

### “Minding The Gap: In Defense of Mind-mind Continuity”

Dorit Bar-On, University of Connecticut

A long tradition of philosophical skeptics have sought to establish on conceptual grounds that the minds of nonhuman animals (and possibly even of very young humans) are separated from *our* minds by an unbridgeable gap. This, it is thought, undermines the possibility of an intelligible philosophical explanation of the natural *emergence* of mind; and it renders futile any search for natural precursors of our own minds in the mental capacities of ‘simpler minds’. My aim here is to engage this *continuity skepticism*. After briefly outlining a radical version of continuity skepticism (as defended by Davidson), I present a form of nonreflective communication that we share with nonlinguistic and prelinguistic creatures: *expressive communication*. I argue that proper appreciation of the role expressive capacities play in the lives of creatures possessing them points to a sensible intermediate stage in (what Wittgenstein would describe as) a natural history that could connect us with our pre-human ancestors (as well as connecting adult language users with their younger preverbal selves). I conclude with some reflections on the implications of the existence of such a natural history for a philosophical understanding of the relationship between human and nonhuman mindedness.

### “Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument”

William Child, Oxford

How do I understand what it is for me to be in pain? How do I understand what it is for someone else to be in pain? And is the property of pain that I ascribe to others on the basis of what they say and do the same as the property I ascribe to myself without evidence? Wittgenstein’s responses to those questions involve a certain anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. That is true of his discussion of introspective ostensive definition in *Philosophical Investigations* §§258 ff. It is also true of his claim that one cannot explain what it is for someone else to be in pain by appeal to the principle, ‘for S to be in pain is for S to be in the same state that I’m in when I’m in pain’. Many contemporary philosophers,

however, reject this kind of anti-platonism. They hold that some properties or standards of similarity are objectively more natural than others: not simply more natural *for us*, but more natural *simpliciter*. And those who accept this ‘natural properties’ view are likely to reject much of what Wittgenstein says about sensations and sensation-language. Recent work by David Papineau and Christopher Peacocke, for instance, does exactly that. The paper explores the prospects, and problems, for this natural properties view in the Philosophy of Mind. How plausible is the natural properties view? Is it a threat to a broadly Wittgensteinian position about sensations and sensation-language? And if so, how well can the Wittgensteinian view withstand the threat?

### **“The Room in a View”**

Charles Travis, King’s College

Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein took up the topic of seeing-as for a second time (the first in the *Tractatus*). This time it is interwoven with discussions of many more parts of mental life. Why the interest? And why the setting? Two motives: 1) to correct the *Tractatus*’ mistaken view (of seeing-as, and of representation) 2) to explore the work of meeting Frege’s challenge: in an account of mental life, always to respect the essential *publicity* of thought. Two lessons which emerge: 1) the importance of distinguishing two forms of authority: expert and executive. 2) Motivations for ‘disjunctivism’ (not that Wittgenstein *was* a disjunctivist). A third: the importance of what Frege saw and young Wittgenstein missed.

### **“A Defence of Wittgenstein’s Naturalism”**

Paul Snowdon, University College, London

Despite his official approach to philosophy being anti-theoretical, I shall argue that Wittgenstein himself does develop views that can illuminatingly be labelled naturalistic – aspects of his thought to which this label applies are his approach to meaning and language, rule following, and also in *On Certainty*. The naturalistic elements that Wittgenstein highlights may not be complete or totally accurate, but I shall argue that we should take our lead from his ideas.

### **“Rational Animals”**

Julia Tanney, University of Kent

What happens if we relinquish the idea that mental predicates serve, in general, to pick out states of a person that give rise to behaviour in a way that is explicable and predictable by inductively-known (i.e., empirical) generalisations? Taking my cue from Wittgenstein and Ryle, I have argued in a number of papers that mental predicates (particularly those figuring in reason-explanation) are internally related to the thick descriptions by which we describe the performances that puzzle us. This position, which is as robustly anti-behaviourist as it is anti-Cartesian, invites a re-examination of the similarities and dissimilarities between species of rational animals. In this talk I shall focus on those animals who share our homes and thus are participants in some of our most treasured (and intimate) normative practices.

## **“Do Pragmatic Naturalists Have Souls? And Should Anyone be Paid to Worry about it?”**

Bjørn Torgrim Ramberg, CSMN, UiO

Philosophy of mind indisputably has a soul; the question of the place of mind in the natural world. Its soul is thus a conflict, a problem of fit; the mental (subjectivity, intentionality, phenomenal experience) is, it seems, crowded out by the scope of natural science. Thus work must be done to mark out or make up appropriate space. Pragmatic naturalists (subject naturalists (Price), urbane verificationists (Dennett), (post-)epistemological behaviorists (Rorty)) by contrast, do not at all take this problem at face value. Inspired to a great extent by Wittgenstein's later work, they think the problem itself is highly problematic. They think that philosophy of mind is a central case of the kind of misplaced intellectual effort characteristically expended by philosophers on various conceptual problems on which the discipline—as a professional endeavour—continues to run. Much of the work of pragmatic naturalists goes into spelling out and backing up this diagnosis. However, some of their work also goes into proposals about what philosophy could be once the first kind of work is taken fully to heart. So pragmatic naturalists are reformers; they call, like Dewey, for a reconstruction of philosophy—philosophy without metaphysics, as is often said. Also, though, philosophy without epistemology, and probably without philosophy of language, and without ethics, as well, at least ethical theory. What, then, is it that pragmatic naturalists actually do, once the debunking lessons are learned? Does the project have a soul? Once naturalism does its work on metaphysics and philosophy of mind, can a pragmatist concern with practice, with the real problems of real human beings, provide disciplinary direction? Or does it amount simply to a wide-open job description for scientifically informed intellectuals-at-large?