THE CHALLENGE OF MUSLIM INCLUSION
A Study in Thresholds

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The challenge of muslim inclusion

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Inclusion of the Muslim minority is a critical issue that contemporary liberal democracies face. In this era of all too frequent terror-attacks by extremists who identify as Muslims and a marked anti-Islamic turn in the rhetoric of the far right in Europe, there are many reasons to worry about the current state of affairs and for future developments. Such worries, and the reasons for them, are the main theme of most current research. We have seen, among other things, a surge in studies on islamophobia and its determinants, on religious extremism and terrorism, and on the rise of the far right and nativism. The overall assessment has been pessimistic. There is much opposition to immigration and policies to assist immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Sides and Citrin 2007; Bloemraad 2006; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), prejudice and hostility towards Muslims (Wright, Johnston, Citrin, and Soroka 2017; Statham 2016; Helbling 2012), and increasing support for nativist parties (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Mudde 2007). Nonetheless, we believe that we can show that there is a greater readiness to accommodate Muslim immigrants in contemporary liberal democracies than has been recognized.

We have not come to this conclusion because we believe previous research is wrong. Quite the contrary. There is an impressive degree of consensus on the principal factors promoting hostility to minorities and opposition to policies to assist them. Differences remain, to be sure, but they are mainly about the degree of importance to assign to different factors – economic, social, psychological – and the connections among them. Among the main findings: There is significant hostility to minorities (Huddy and Feldman 2009), including and sometimes especially, to Muslims (Storm, Sobolewska, and Ford 2016; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009). This intergroup hostility cannot be explained fully by opposing economic interests. If anything, the causal arrow is likely to run in the opposite direction (Mutz and Kim forthcoming). We also have to take into account social factors, such a contact and exposure (Enos 2014; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), and, not least, psychological factors, such as prejudice (Fiske et al. 2002; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Likely, economic, social, and psychological factors combine in a
variety of ways to generate hostility. Furthermore, we agree with previous research that hostility against minorities is associated with a higher likelihood of supporting strict policies of integration and immigration and with voting for nativist parties (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Ford 2011; Ivarsflaten 2008). It is our claim, nonetheless, that there is social support for inclusion.

We shall show that majorities of national majorities are willing to affirm the value of Muslims as Muslims. But it does not follow that the challenge of inclusion is less formidable than has been claimed. Some of the obstacles are well known; others less so. We accordingly bring into the open for the first time a prime obstacle that has escaped attention: the political loyalty of the leadership of Muslim communities is doubly suspect: first, because they are Muslim, then on top of this, because they are leaders of Muslim communities.

1. Terms of Agreement

This study explores a simple insight. The willingness of citizens to be inclusive depends on what being inclusive asks of them. The question then is not how desirable majority citizens believe that inclusion of Muslim minorities is, but rather the conditions under which they will support and the conditions under which they will oppose inclusion. What are they ready to ask of themselves? Which terms are acceptable to them? Why do they support inclusion on those terms but not on others?

The terms of agreement must be acceptable to all parties to the agreement – Muslim minorities as well as national majorities. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine the responses of national majorities to a term of inclusion consensually understood as a necessary condition of agreement: majorities’ acknowledgement of the worth of Muslims and their faith.
1.2 Performative Utterances

The focus of research has been evaluative orientations towards Muslim immigrants – how much do national majorities like them or not; how commonly or not do they believe that they exploit the welfare state; how willing or not are national majorities to have them as neighbors; confident or not are national majorities that Muslim immigrants have given their first loyalty to their new country.¹ In contrast, our focus is not on how national majorities feel about Muslim immigrants but how they believe they ought to treat them – or as we shall say, performative norms.

A performative utterance is at once an instance of saying and doing. Saying, “I do” at the appropriate moment in a wedding ceremony is not simply or only saying something. It is doing something.² The key contrast, for us, is between expressive and performative.³ What is at issue is not how native citizens feel about Muslims or their culture and history. It is how they treat them. It is arguably a better world if groups like each other. But what counts in the end is how they treat one another.

Inclusion of Muslim immigrants requires acknowledgement of the worth of their identity as Muslims.⁴ Hence our focus on performative verbs. To acknowledge the worth of Muslims is both to express a sentiment and to perform an act; to respect. It is an example of a larger set of performative verbs signifying recognition of worth, protect, celebrate, publicly recognize among

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¹ E.g. Spruyt and Elchardus (2012); Straback, Aalberg and Valenta (2014); Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009); Straback and Listhaug (2008).
² These are some of the examples J.L. Austin gives in introducing his discussion of performative utterances. See Austin, J.L. 1979. For an exemplary close up, critical exposition of Austin’s view of performance utterances, see Warnock 1989, especially, ch. 5, Words and Deeds, pp. 105-151. .
³ Ours, in contrast, is to contrast the expressive and the performative. In contrast, Austin’s aim was to spotlight the difference between the constative and the performative. He himself worked to bring out the limitations of his conceptualization. It seems fair to say, roughly, that he succeeded in identifying sufficient but not necessary conditions for specification of performatives.
⁴ There is disagreement on whether inclusion may require more than public acknowledge of worth and, naturally, just what constitutes acknowledgement. There is agreement, however, that acknowledgement of worth in the senses we use it is a necessary condition of inclusion, if inclusion reaches beyond toleration and equal treatment under the law. On the other side, it cannot be said that just what is or is not a value of Muslim immigrants has been pinned down empirically.
them. If national majorities concur that the cultural distinctiveness of Muslims ought to be acknowledged, respected, publicly recognized and the like, we shall say a performative norm in favor of inclusion has been established.

It is our conjecture that a performative norm in favor of inclusion has been established. This is a conjecture, but it is not an unreasonable one. Studies are accumulating of prosocial dispositions in mass publics – for example, a motivation to control prejudice (Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013; Hartevedt and Ivarsflaten 2016); inclusive tolerance (Sniderman, Petersen, Slothuus and Stubager 2014); and a readiness to sympathize with minorities (Chudy 2016). There is, we hypothesize, a companion disposition, an understanding that, though national majorities do not necessarily have an obligation to like minorities, they do have an obligation to treat them well, where treating them well is understood to mean treating them with respect.

How far are majorities of national majorities willing to go? Where will they draw the line? A guide is the connection between identification and duty. Members of a group, by virtue of their identification with the group, have an obligation to sustain and support the values of the group. But they do not have a comparable obligation to sustain and support the values of other groups. So far as a distinction between what one owes one’s own group and what one owes other groups has bite, national majorities will draw the line at having to take responsibility for or play an active role in supporting or sustaining a minority’s culture, its practices and traditions.5

Our objective is to assess the readiness of national majorities to meet one of the necessary terms of inclusion – acknowledgment of the worth of Muslims and their faith. Our

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5 This will lead in a number of countries to the appearance of a double standard: a difference between the status of Christianity and other religions (or the absence of religious faith). Not surprisingly, prejudice is responsible to a significant degree. More interestingly, this “double standard” also brings out a tension in the values of contemporary liberal democracies. To be clear, we are not saying that this is where the line ought to be drawn. How far national majorities ought to be ready to go is a normative issue, to be argued and decided on normative grounds. We are saying that this is where they empirically draw a line.
operational method, accordingly, is to assess responses to an array of threshold verbs to
determine responses to this criterion defined in progressively ambitious terms.

2. *The Importance of Diversity*

Our starting point is a progression of experimental trials assessing the readiness of national
majorities to affirm or attest to the worth of diversity in their country. Threshold verbs marking
different levels of affirmation of the value of diversity include protect, recognize, celebrate,
praise, promote. It is agreed (Crowder 2013) that to “acknowledge” the importance of diversity
marks a necessary minimum threshold of inclusion; to “celebrate” the importance of diversity
points to an upper bound.

The first experiment was conducted in Norway. A randomly selected half of a nationally
representative sample of adult Norwegians was asked if they agree or disagree (and if so how
strongly) that:

"It is important to acknowledge the new diversity of Norway."

The other half was asked whether they agree or disagree (and if so how strongly) that:

"It is important to celebrate the new diversity of Norway." 6

Everything is thus identical in the two experimental conditions except for the upper and lower
threshold verbs. The dependent variable is dichotomous: all who agree are scored 1; all who do
not agree (including those who choose Neither agree Nor disagree) are scored 0.

The prediction is that a majority of native citizens will go beyond just tolerating or
putting up with diversity. They are ready to take an active part in affirming its value. But their
readiness to affirm diversity as a value depends on what affirming it as a value entails. So far
fewer will do so as the terms of inclusion become more demanding. The upper panel of Table 1

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6 The response format was 7-point: Strongly agree; Agree; Agree somewhat; Neither agree nor
disagree; Disagree Somewhat; Disagree; Strongly disagree. To facilitate comparison across different
response formats, the item was scored percent agreeing in any degree = 1; neither agree nor disagree
= .5; disagreeing in any degree = 0.
records the responses of Norwegians. An overwhelming proportion, on the order of three in every four, take the position that it is important to acknowledge the new diversity of Norway. Far fewer, less than one in two, are willing to go so far in playing an affirmative role as to celebrate the new diversity of their country.

A readiness to acknowledge the worth of diversity is an accepted standard for being inclusive. The results in the upper panel of Table 1 suggest that a majority of a national majority open to inclusion, so defined. But this answer only raises a further question. What does it mean to “acknowledge” the importance of diversity in their country? Is it acknowledge in the sense of recognition of the worth of diversity? Or, alternatively, is it acknowledge in the sense of recognizing that diversity is now the fact of the matter like it or not? How can one tell which it is? If it is the first, Table 1 offers evidence of popular support for inclusion. If it is the second, Table 1 offers no evidence of popular support for inclusion one way or the other.

The problem is to determine what native citizens mean when they agree, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of our country. Meaning is inescapably subjective. Nonetheless, the criterion we propose is objective. Two terms mean the same thing just so far as each can be substituted for the other *sine mutandis*. To “respect” a person is to attest to her worth. It follows that, just so far as to respect and to acknowledge are interchangeable, to acknowledge the importance of diversity is to affirm its worth. A second experiment accordingly randomizes respect and acknowledge as threshold verbs. In addition, as part of the introduction of a new strategy of replication, the second stage design of the Affirmation of Diversity experiment repeats “celebrate” as a threshold verb.7 The heart of this replication strategy is thus to hold

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7 Specifically, respondents were asked if they agree or disagree that it is important to [acknowledge/respect/celebrate] the cultural and ethnic diversity of the United States, and if so, how strongly.”
constant the wording of a test item, while both repeating and adding threshold verbs, in order simultaneously replicate and extend findings of previous experimental trials.  

The second stage of the Affirmation of Diversity experiment was conducted in the United States. Again, the dependent variable is scored dichotomously: all who agree receive a 1; all who do not agree receive 0. Our concern is the reaction of national majorities to diversity. Accordingly, the middle panel of Table 1 reports the responses of white Americans.

Insert Table 1 About Here

The primary objective of the second study is to establish whether, when native citizens are ready to acknowledge the importance of diversity in their country, “acknowledge” is doing descriptive work, that is, signaling that they recognize diversity is a fact of the matter like it or not; or, alternatively, doing evaluative work, that is, conveying their recognition of the worth of diversity. Respect manifestly is an approval verb. The middle panel of Table 1 shows the proportion responding positively to the threshold verbs, acknowledge and respect. It is strikingly high, on the order of four out five, and equally so for both. Acknowledge is an approval verb; indeed, as fully as is respect. It also should be underlined that the results of the second study replicate those of the first. The absolute levels of support for diversity as a value are higher in all experimental conditions in the American than in the Norwegian study. But the pattern of differences across experimental conditions is identical. Again, a majority of a national majority is willing to acknowledge the importance of diversity in their country. And again, there is a marked difference in their readiness to acknowledge its importance versus their readiness to celebrate it.

Two studies show majorities of national majorities acknowledge the importance of diversity, meeting the necessary threshold of inclusion. But how farther are they willing to go? How much can be asked of them without their readiness to support diversity falling?

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8 The response format is not the same in the two studies. In the Norwegian study, it is a 7-point Likert agree-disagree with a neutral, neither nor response option. In the American study, the response format is a 4-point Likert agree-disagree format without a neutral response option.
It is widely agreed that personally valuing diversity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for inclusion. The acknowledgment of the larger society itself of the importance of diversity is required (Crowder 2013.) Are national majorities willing to go this far? The third stage design again holds constant the operational template of the Affirmation of Diversity experiment, simultaneously repeating the threshold verbs of previous experimental trials – acknowledge, celebrate, respect -- while adding a new threshold – publicly recognize to the set.

The political question is whether national majorities are open to public acknowledgment of the worth of diversity. The final stage design varies four approval verbs – acknowledge, celebrate, respect, and publicly recognize. The crucial issue is whether, when native citizens declare that they recognize the importance of diversity, they are expressing what they as individuals ought to do or what the larger society ought to do. The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the reactions of a nationally representative sample of adults in the United Kingdom. The results document a striking readiness to publicly recognize the importance of diversity; indeed, the option to publicly recognize diversity garners as much support as to acknowledge or to respect it. In declaring that they believe diversity is a value, native citizens are backing a course of action for the larger society to take. In addition, in reviewing the results of this third experimental trail, we would again be remiss if we did not underline how they also replicate the results of previous two experimental trials. Again, there is a distinct difference in reactions to acknowledge (column one) and to celebrate (column 2), although as in the second experiment, the difference is not as dramatic as in the first experiment. And again, to acknowledge (column one) and to respect (column three) are each substitutable for the another *sine mutandis*.

Public opinion measures are coarse, ours as much as others’, and comparing surveys conducted in different languages only makes them more so. What is more, measures of opinion are ordinal; assumptions of equal intervals unwarranted; claims beyond more and less, or perhaps, a lot or a little unjustified – all warnings that should be italicized for comparisons across countries. Warnings about the imprecision of public opinion measures given, we would
be remiss if we did not call attention specifically to the levels of support for “celebrating” diversity. We did not anticipate that they would be as high as they are in two of the studies. We had expected that they would be as low or possibly lower as they are in the other study. The possibility that our results misleadingly overstate support for inclusion when the terms of acceptance are comparatively demanding – that is, when to count as support requires a readiness to praise – is an issue that needs to be confronted.

More fundamentally, the results of the “Affirmation of Diversity” experiment show higher levels of public support for inclusion. But, it must be asked, is that because of the particular aspect of inclusion on which this experiment focuses – namely, the importance of diversity. What would we see if we focused directly on Muslims specifically? Are national majorities open to being inclusive, when being inclusive means acknowledging the worth of the culture and values of Muslims?

3. **Muslim Traditions and Values**

Our objective is to explore the readiness of native citizens to be inclusive of Muslim culture and values. Being inclusive necessarily requires going beyond a stance of being simply willing to put with or tolerate Muslim culture and values. The question is, how far beyond tolerance must one go to be inclusive.

It is not necessary to agree with Muslim practices and values. Nor is it necessary to believe that, although you yourself do not share certain Muslim values, they nonetheless are worthy of emulation by others. Nor, finally, is it necessary to believe that you have the same duty to sustain and support the values of others as you have to sustain and support your values. To be concrete, it would be self-contradictory to assert that a person who is committed to gender equality is under an obligation to sustain and support the Muslim conceptions of gender
equity. It is, however, necessary to treat the values of Muslims, their culture and history, with respect.

Our hypothesis is that a majority of national majorities are open to inclusion. By open to inclusion we mean that they will go beyond tolerating Muslim minorities. They may not feel warmly about them. Indeed, they are likely to be wary. But they are cognizant of the difference between how one feels about others and how one ought to treat them; and they accept that they ought to treat them with respect. But there is a difference between the obligations that they have to their values and traditions and those of others. So while a majority takes the position that they have a duty to treat the culture and values of minorities with respect, they do not believe this entails taking responsibility for sustaining or supporting them. A second experimental sequence puts this hypothesis to a direct test.

In the Respect versus Protect experiment respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that “[Muslims/Immigrants] have a right to have their traditions and cultures [respected/protected]. The top panel of Table 2 reports the responses of a nationally representative sample in Norway. Manifestly, Norwegians draw a sharp distinction between “respecting” versus “protecting” Muslim culture and values. A clear majority, on the order of 7 in every 10, take the position that they have a right to have their traditions and cultures respected. Far fewer, on the order of 25 percentage less, take the position that they have a right to have their traditions and values protected. Just as clearly, they do not respond distinctively to the claims that “immigrants” are entitled to make and those that “Muslim immigrants” have a right to make. In both experimental conditions, respect and protect, the differences in responses to Muslim immigrants versus immigrants are trivial, failing to be statistically, let alone substantively, significant.

Insert Table 2 About Here

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9 Again we focus on percent agree because of a variation in “house” styles in the use or not of a middle Neither agree nor disagree response option, with agree scored as 1, not agreeing scored as 0.
In light of the concern over replication, the Respect versus Protect experiment has been done in two additional countries. The first is the United Kingdom (middle panel of Table 2); the second the United States (bottom panel of Table 2. The results of both experiments confirm the two findings of the first experiment: national majorities draw a sharp distinction between respecting and protect the culture and values of a minority; on the other hand, they do not draw a distinction between Muslims and immigrants.

The consistent result, then, from both experimental trials, Affirmation of Diversity and the Respect versus Protect, is that majorities of national majorities actively affirm the values of minorities. It is nonetheless worth noting again that we did not anticipate how high the level of support would be for, in this case, taking a measure of responsibility for the values of a minority. What might this signify?

One response is to underline yet again that public opinion measures are ordinal, no better; that therefore there is no basis for an assumption of equal intervals; and that no particular importance should be attached to the particular numbers recorded in different experimental conditions. All that can confidently be judged is more and less. This would excuse us from having to explain why the results did not turn out as we expected in this particular respect. But the excuse is worrisomely convenient.

The similarity of responses to Muslims and immigrants points to another possibility. It is not plausible to suppose that native citizens in large numbers believe it is their responsibility to assure that the values and culture of Muslim immigrants should flourish. It is not implausible, however, to believe that substantial numbers believe that they a duty to work for a society in which differing ideas in general about what is right or valuable or admirable can flourish and therefore have a duty to safeguard Muslim immigrants, but not Muslim immigrants specially, against bigotry and discrimination.

Is the openness to difference general? Or does the evidence in hand speak only to how native citizens respond to Muslims in particular? Much depends on whether, when native
citizens call to mind “immigrants,” they think of Muslim immigrants and vice versa. In reality, Muslim immigrants are not the largest share of immigrants in any of countries in which we conducted studies. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the two have become largely interchangeable in the minds of native citizens in Norway. The same can arguably be said about the United Kingdom, though possibly with less confidence. But there is no evidence that immigrant means Muslim immigrant in the United States. To this extent, there is reason to believe the openness of national majorities to Muslim immigrants is a particular manifestation of a broader phenomenon.

However that may be, the takeaway from both the Affirmation of Diversity and the Respect versus Protect experiments is the same. A far larger share of native citizens is ready to be supportive of inclusion of Muslims than has been recognized. Just how many depends on what supporting inclusion asks of them. If the terms of inclusion are treating Muslims, their values and culture, with respect, majorities of national majorities are on board. If the terms of inclusion call for taking an active responsibility for sustaining the values and traditions of Muslims, the largest number are not.

4. *An Overlooked Challenge*

To this point, the objective has been to bring into view layers of support for inclusion that have been out of sight because of the exclusive focus on exclusion. But just as there has been an overly pessimistic view of the possibility for inclusion because of a failure to take into account the ethos of contemporary liberal democracies, so, too, there can be an overly optimistic view of the possibilities because of a failure to take into account the political processes of inclusion.

Working through the terms of inclusion requires coming to agreement with Muslim communities. Much depends, it follows, on the leadership of Muslim communities – both what
they are willing to propose and, no less important, their credibility in making and agreeing to proposals. Here lies one of the most pressing – and overlooked – problems.

Islamophobia, like other forms of prejudice, involves a predisposition to reject, to dislike, to demean, to punish, to stereotype members of a group by virtue of their membership in the group. So Muslims, just like other minorities, are stereotyped as lazy, violent, all too ready to complain, all too ready to take advantage of welfare and other government assistance without recognizing that they have a corresponding duty to do their best to contribute to the common welfare. But Muslims are stigmatized in ways that other minorities are not, or at any rate to nothing like the same degree.

Perhaps the most pernicious is a stereotype of disloyalty. It has been shown that Muslim immigrants are stunningly more likely than other immigrants to be perceived as disloyal, as politically untrustworthy, as more loyal to the country they came from than to the country they chose to live in. But what this implies has not been appreciated. We worry about others in proportion to their capacity to harm us. It follows that, if native citizens perceive ordinary Muslims as politically untrustworthy, they will be still more likely to perceive leaders of Muslim communities as politically disloyal. The loyalty of Muslim leaders will thus be doubly suspect: first, because they are Muslims; then, on top of this, because they are leaders of Muslim communities.

A hypothesis that the loyalty of Muslim leaders is doubly suspect is surely worth exploration. An experiment in Norway provides a starting point. The objective is to see whether, in fact, native citizens are markedly more likely to question the loyalty of Muslim leaders than the loyalty of ordinary Muslims. So native citizens were asked at random about the commitment to their new country of Muslims and Muslim leaders, and to provide a reference for reactions to both, moderate Muslims. Specifically, we asked a nationally representative sample

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10 E.g. chapters on measuring “Islamophobia” in Hebling (2012).
11 Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009.
of adult Norwegians: “How much do you trust or distrust [Muslims/Muslim leaders/moderate Muslims] when they say that they want to become part of our country?” The first column of Table 3 reports their reactions. Responses are scored 1 if distrust is their response. Otherwise they are scored 0. The means reported in Table 3 can thus be read as percentages.

The prediction is that native citizens are markedly more likely to suspect the loyalty of “Muslim leaders” than the loyalty of ordinary Muslims. And so they are: more than half of Norwegians question the loyalty of Muslim leaders (55%), compared to a third (35%) who question the loyalty of ordinary Muslims – a result unambiguously consistent with the hypothesis of double suspicion. Nonetheless the results deserve reflection. As the bottom row of the first column shows, Norwegians perceive ordinary Muslims and “moderate Muslims" similarly. For all practical purposes, one may say that Muslims means moderate Muslim.

Is this result encouraging? Or is it reason for concern? It has a good sound to say that, when native citizens think “Muslim,” they think “moderate Muslim.” But does that reflect well on ordinary Muslims or poorly on moderate Muslims? It is sobering to observe that fully one in every four Norwegians suspect the commitment of Muslims to their new country even if they are moderate. It is not unreasonable to entertain the idea that perceiving moderate Muslims as suspect as Muslims in general – rather than Muslims in general as free of suspicion as moderate Muslims – is closer to the mark.

The key question, though, is who are native citizens thinking of when they think of Muslim “leaders?” There is an obvious conjecture – Muslim religious leaders. For Muslims, culture tends to coincide with religion. Points of difference that otherwise would appear to be of superficial importance or transitory can appear intransigent when cultural practices are religious obligations. And just so far as the overlap of religious and cultural values tends to define Muslim immigrants in the eyes of native citizens, when they think of Muslim leaders, they are all too likely to be thinking of Muslim religious leaders.
A second experiment conducted in Denmark tests this hypothesis while, again taking advantage of the economies of a sequential factorial, simultaneously subjecting the results of the first experiment to a replication test. The two key results of the Norwegian experiment are the dissimilarity of assessments of Muslims and Muslim leaders and the similarity of assessments of Muslims and moderate Muslims. The results of the Suspect Loyalty experiment in Denmark, shown in column 2 of Table 3, confirm both: distrust of Muslim leaders is plainly more pervasive than distrust of ordinary Muslims, and Danes perceive Muslims and moderate Muslims in similar terms. It is worth noting that the levels of distrust of Muslims of all types are higher in Denmark, though whether this difference should be put down to substantive factors or treated as a measurement artifact remains to be determined.

The all-important question is, who are native citizens thinking of when they think of Muslim leaders? The response to the Muslim leaders and Muslim religious leaders is indistinguishable. When native citizens think of Muslim leaders, they are thinking of Muslim religious leaders. But what, one must immediately ask, are they thinking of when they think of Muslim religious leaders?

Again there is an obvious conjecture. What comes to mind is a picture of a man, middle age or older, with a beard, a white cap or covering on his head and wearing a white gown, and – this is key – a stern, forbidding expression on this face? Which is to say, when native citizens think of Muslim religious leaders, they think of Islamic fundamentalists, forbidding, unapproachable, menacing.

A third experiment was conducted, this time in Norway, to test this hypothesis while, again, putting the findings of the previous experiments to a replication. Holding the test item constant, respondents were randomly asked about Muslims, Muslim leaders, moderate Muslims, and Muslim fundamentalists. As the third column of Table 3 shows, the same pattern of results in this experiment as in the previous two. Again, markedly more suspicion of Muslim leaders than of ordinary Muslims, approximately the same levels of suspicion of ordinary Muslims and
moderate Muslims. And the key question: when natives think of Muslim religious leaders, are they thinking of Islamic fundamentalists? Yes, pretty much, was the answer we had expected. No, clearly not, is the answer in Table 3. The level of suspicion of Muslim fundamentalists is way higher than of Muslim leaders: 39% doubt the commitment of Muslim leaders to Norway; 82% doubt the commitment of Muslim fundamentalists.

It is good news that native citizens, when they think of Muslim leaders, do not automatically think of Muslim fundamentalists. But it is not good news that, when they think of Muslim leaders, they think of Muslim religious leaders. Clearly, Muslim leaders are handicapped by being doubly suspect. They must lead and represent their communities. But by virtue of leading and representing their communities, they open themselves up to suspicions of being politically untrustworthy. So it is worth investigating the automaticity of the association of Muslim leaders and Muslim religious leaders.

The final experiment, conducted in Norway, explored the difficulty of disconnecting the association of Muslim leaders and Muslim religious leaders. We repeated the operational template one more time. The randomized terms in the fill were: Muslims, Muslim leaders, Muslim religious leaders, Muslim extremists, and – to test the automaticity of the connection between Muslim leaders and Muslim religious leaders, Muslim local politicians and Muslim female leaders.

The results in the last column of Table 3 make two points. Again, the pattern of differences between experimental conditions replicates the pattern from previous experiments. But there is new information as well. The results, shown in the bottom two rows of the sixth column, make plain that native citizens can and do differentiate between Muslim religious leaders. Muslim local politicians and Muslim female politicians are perceived to be more, not less, committed to their new countries than ordinary Muslims.

5. Qualifications and Conclusions

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Our major findings show support for inclusion. How reassuring are these results? And what do they say about the politics of inclusion?

It is natural to think of political conflict as turning on the outcome of opposing forces. Politics, so conceived, consists on a competition between teams. On the simplest model, there are two teams with opposing goals. One works to realize a program of the left, the other to realize a program of the right. Electoral politics turns the efforts of the leaders of the two teams to win more popular support than the other.

The metaphor of opposing forces has uses. But it misses the asymmetry of the politics of inclusion. Inclusion and exclusion are not on the same footing. Opposition to immigrants and immigration is crystallized It is tempting to apply this metaphor to the results of our experiments. Previous research has concentrated on forces favoring exclusion. The results of our experiments have brought into the open support for inclusion. The politics of immigration, it is natural to suppose, turns on the clash between these opposing forces.

The metaphor of opposing forces may come naturally to mind. But it is doubly misleading. Pro and con on inclusion are not on the same footing. Support for exclusion has a propulsive force. Those who dislike or disdain or fear Muslim immigrants are motivated to act on their feelings. In contrast, a readiness to acknowledge the worth of diversity or of Muslims and their culture does not have a propulsive force. It does not drive voters to press for more overtures to including Muslim immigrants. Instead it enlarges the area of actions that voters will allow office holders to take without being punished for taking them.12 In V.O. Key’s classic expression, support for inclusion represents a permissive consensus.

If the metaphor of opposing forces is a misfit, what metaphor fits our results? It is a labor contract. Contracts set out a goal to achieve – most commonly, that workers go back to work and production gets going again. But setting out a goal is not the purpose of a contract;

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12 Another possibility is worth noting. Elite culture favors inclusion, or at a minimum, supports opposing exclusion. Office holders offering proposals for inclusion, though they may only receive permission from voters to do so, may receive support and resources from elites to do so.
and the purpose of bargaining is not to persuade the parties that getting a business going again and workers paid again is a desirable goal. Rather it is to specify terms which the parties can agree on so that the workers go back to work and production gets going again.

So it is with the politics of inclusion. What majorities and minorities will do on behalf of inclusion fundamentally depends not on whether they believe that inclusion is desirable but on what being inclusive asks of them. The key, then, is the terms of inclusion: How far are majorities and minorities willing to go? Where do they draw the line? And why do they draw it there and not elsewhere?

Our results have brought out how far native citizens are willing to go. Majorities of national majorities are ready to acknowledge the worth of diversity and of Muslims, their culture and values. That may not be far enough. But it is much farther than anyone has realized.
Bibliography


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Table 1 – Acknowledgement of Worth of Diversity

Support for Diversity

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<td>United Kingdom15</td>
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13 NCP 2
14 CCES 2012
15 UK 2
Table 2 – Respect vs. Protect Muslim Culture and Values

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<tr>
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<th>Respect</th>
<th>Protect</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong>&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(02)</td>
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|                  |         |         |
| **United Kingdom**<sup>17</sup> |         |         |
| Muslims          | .67     | .52     |
|                  | (.02)   | (.01)   |
| Immigrants       | .72     | .57     |
|                  | (.02)   | (03)    |

|                  |         |         |
| **United States**<sup>18</sup> |         |         |
| Muslims          | .84     | .65     |
|                  | (.02)   | (.02)   |
| Muslims          | .78     | .60     |
|                  | (.02)   | (02)    |

<sup>16</sup> NCP 1  
<sup>17</sup> UK 2  
<sup>18</sup> Whites only
Table 3  Suspect Loyalties: Mean Level of Distrust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway 2 *</th>
<th>Denmark 2 **</th>
<th>Denmark 3 ***</th>
<th>Norway 6 ***</th>
<th>Norway 8 ***</th>
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* NCP 5-point Likert  ** YouGov 5-point Likert  *** NCP 7-point Likert