Erik Brown: The limits of relativism

I have chosen to call my talk "The limits of Relativism". In fact, I try to argue for two related limits. In the first place, I try to show that at least concerning factual knowledge an all-embracing constructivism leaving no place for mind-independent truths, can be rejected. Concerning normative beliefs in aesthetics and ethics there may be a stronger case to be made for an irreducible subjectivist account of our claims to knowledge. In aesthetics, moreover, I argue that we can accept a benign relativism with equinamity. In ethics this seems more difficult, but concerning ethical claims I discuss whether an objectivist conception of our factual beliefs may have a spill-over effect on normative issues. Granted that normative beliefs have factual presuppositions in addition to normative ones, cannot the objective falsity of some of their factual underpinnings be sufficient for undermining their justification. So, even if Hume is right in thinking that purely factual knowledge cannot be the sole base of positive normative knowledge, the connection between factual and normative beliefs is sufficiently strong for facts to falsify normative claims. This is still a work in progress, but in my talk I hope to cover at least the case I make for objective factual truths and the repercussions factual objectivity may have for the objective falsity of at least some normative claims.