Jakub Gomułka: Manipulation or rational argumentation: a radical change of a worldview
Professor Jakub Gomułka fra Institutt for filosofi og sosiologi ved Det pedagogiske universitet i Kraków besøker for tiden Wittgensteinarkivet. Noen av dere har allerede møtt ham, men for de som ikke har det eller som ønsker å høre mer om en av hans hovedinteresser innenfor Wittgenstein-forskningen, vil han gi en gjesteforelesning. Forelesningen holdes på engelsk og arrangeres i samarbeid mellom Wittgensteinarkivet og Wittgenstein-forskningsgruppen. - Oppdatering 24.9.: Efter avtale med Jakub blir gjesteforelesningen hybrid, altså både fysisk og live-strømmet (men ikke opptak). De som ønsker å overvære per Zoom bes ta kontakt med kontaktperson for å få tilsendt Zoom-lenken.
Hovedinnhold
Sammendrag
"In the paper, I shall discuss the question of the possibility of rational argumentation between two parties who fundamentally disagree. Wittgenstein’s fictitious example of G. E. Moore encountering a king who thinks that the earth came into existence with his birth serves as an example of such a disagreement, but the paper shall shed light on differences in moral views rather than epistemic ones. It seems that the second (and third) Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of any rational debate between people who do not share basic beliefs regarding, for instance, the criteria of decency. Contrary to this view, I shall argue that the so-called ‘hinge epistemology’ developed in On Certainty makes room for extra-systemic argumentation as it differentiates between hinge propositions – basic certainties that regulate our standard ways of reasoning – from criteria of meaning. One result of this distinction is that we are actually able to understand what the rejection of our hinge propositions would mean and hence we can have doubts about them. The basis for such doubts can be tensions raised by our emotional and behavioural reactions, which Wittgenstein calls ‘primitive.’
It is a part of our well-established scientific knowledge that emotions play part in any process of decision making: yet another aspect of the old Cartesian image of human being has been proven wrong by contemporary cognitive sciences. However, the problem is that the outdated image is being replaced with a mechanistic view that leaves no room for freedom and rationality. I shall try to defend a different view that goes beyond mere causal explanation of our behaviour. The key element of that view shall be a concept of emotional narrative."