Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic


The Normativity of Logic

The Department of Philosophy is hosting an international conference on the normativity of logic, June 14-16, 2017. The conference is part of the project `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic', funded by the Norwegian Research Council.

Conference dates: June 14-16th, 2017

Venue: Sydneshaugen Skole, Aud. A, The University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

Programme: see attachment below

Invited speakers:

Contributed speakers:

Logic tells you what follows from what, it tells you when an argument is valid, and when a theory is inconsistent. So, logic describes what follows from your attitudes, whether your reasoning is valid, and whether your beliefs are consistent. 

It is widely held that in addition logic provides epistemic norms. Logic prescribes what someone with your attitudes ought to believe, how you ought to reason and whether your current epistemic state is permissible. These epistemic norms have authority over mental states and acts akin to how moral norms have authority over ordinary acts. To violate these norms is to do something epistemologically impermissible. It is to be irrational.

In recent years there has been a resurgent interest in the normativity of logic, including attempts at saying clearly what those epistemic norms actually are, and what their import is in cases of belief revision.

Following this trend, this conference is devoted to questions such as:

  • In what sense, if any, is logic normative?
  • What norms for thinking does logic actually provide?
  • What is the connection between evidential norms and the norms provided by logic?
  • What is the connection between logic and the aim of belief?



Day 1 (Wednesday June 14th)

09:15 Opening

Chair: Ole Hjortland (University of Bergen)

09:30 - 10:45 Hartry Field (New York University), Disagreement over Logic

10:45 - 11:00 Break

11:00 - 11:45 Colin Caret (Yonsei University), Rejection in a Paraconsistent Setting

11:45 - 12:00 Break 12:00 - 12:45 James Shaw (University of Pittsburgh), Inference and the Normativity of Logic

12:45 - 14:15 Lunch (Christie Café [map])

Chair: Andreas Fjellstad (University of Bergen)

14:15 - 15:00 Luis Rosa (MCMP, LMU Munich), Ways in which logic was supposed to be special, but ain’t

15:00 - 15:15 Break

15:15 - 16:00 Tyke Nunez (Washington University), The Normativity of Kant’s Conception of Pure General Logic: A reply to MacFarlane

16:00 - 16:30 Break

16:30 - 17:45 John MacFarlane (University of California, Berkeley), Is Logic a Normative Discipline?


Day 2 (Thursday June 15th)

Chair: Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford University)

09:30 - 10:45 Corine Besson (University of Sussex), The Normativity of Logic

10:45 - 11:00 Break

11:00 - 11:45 Filippo Ferrari (University of Bonn), Logic, Norms, and Reasoning

11:45 - 12:00 Break

12:00 - 12:45 Elena Tassoni (University of Bologna), Logic, Rationality and the Bridge Principles

12:45 - 14:15 Lunch (Department of Philosophy, Seminar room, ground floor [map])

Chair: Thomas Brouwer (University of Leeds)

14:15 - 15:00 Ethan Jerzak (University of California, Berkeley), From Logical Pluralism to Logical Contextualism

15:00 - 15:15 Break

15:15 - 16:00 Claire Field & Bruno Jacinto (University of St Andrews), Bridge Principles and Purely Epistemic Norms

16:00 - 16:30 Break 

16:30 - 17:45 Florian Steinberger (Birkbeck College, University of London), What it might mean for logic to be normative

19:00 Conference Dinner (Naboen Restaurant, Sigurds gate 4 [map])


Day 3 (Friday June 16th)

Chair: Nader Shoaibi (University of Illinois, Chicago)

09:30 - 10:45 Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol), Epistemic Value and the Normativity of Logic

10:45 - 11:00 Break

11:00 - 11:45 Thomas Brouwer (University of Leeds), Treating Logic Expressively: Normativity and Exceptionalism

11:45 - 12:00 Break

12:00 - 12:45 Mike Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Logical Reasons and Reasons for

12:45 - 14:15 Lunch

Chair: Florian Steinberger (Birkbeck College, University of London)

14:15 - 15:30 Anandi Hattiangadi (University of Stockholm), Logical Disagreement

15:30 - 16:00 Break

16:00 - 17:15 Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford), Logic: Fundamental but not Exceptional