Talk by Chris Menzel: In defense of the possibilism-actualism distinction

On the 21st of September, Chris Menzel (Texas A&M University) willl give a talk entitled `In defense of the possibilism-actualism distinction'. Menzel has written a number of important articles on modality and metaphysics, and he is among other things the author of the recent SEP entry `Possible worlds'. More information about the talk below.

The talk is hosted by the RCN-project `Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic'.

Time: 12.15-14.00

Room: 130 (Sydnesplassen)

IN DEFENSE OF THE POSSIBILISM-ACTUALISM DISTINCTION

Christopher Menzel

Texas A&M University

In his important book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson claims that “there is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the possibilism-actualism [P-A] distinction” and, indeed, that usage of the terms 'possibilism' and 'actualism' “has become badly confused”. To rectify the situation, Williamson introduces a distinction between necessitism and contingentism that he argues is free of the confusions that allegedly plague the P-A distinction. In this talk I begin by discussing some of the historical antecedents of what I call the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction. I then turn to Williamson's attack on the P-A distinction and examine in particular two arguments that he sketches that purport to show that problems will arise for any proposed definition of the distinction; I find both arguments wanting. I will then discuss Williamson's preferred necessitism-contingentism distinction and argue that the subsistence conception of the P-A distinction can be faithfully reconstructed within Williamson's necessitist framework and, hence, is no more confused or unsatisfying than his distinction. However, Williamson's framework does point to a genuine shortcoming in the subsistence conception, namely, that, as typically formulated, it cannot force Williamson  into the possibilist category where he belongs, despite his commitment to the existence of such classical possibilia as Wittgenstein's merely possible children. I close by proposing a new definition of the P-A distinction in terms of essential properties that avoids this shortcoming.