1st Workshop in the Anti-Exceptionalism Project: Logic as science
The Department of Philosophy is hosting a workshop entitled `Logic as science' November 18-19th 2016.
Main content
According to W. V. Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, logic is a science. Like theories in physics, economics, and biology, logical theories may be revised, and sometimes even as a result of empirical evidence. In advocating a gradualism between logic and the empirical sciences, Quine subverts the foundationalist ambitions of logic. Logic cannot be justified a priori, nor are the truths of logic analytic.
Quine's anti-exceptionalism about logic has opened up a series of important questions. What are logical theories theories of? What counts as evidence for such theories? What are the criteria for theory choice in logic? Do these criteria, whatever they are, favour classical logic or nonclassical logic? And what is left of the normative status of logic if we accept Quine's gradualism?
PROGRAMME
Se attachment below for official programme and abstracts.
Friday 18th November
- 09:00 Welcome
- 09:15 Ole Hjortland (Bergen), What counts as evidence for a logical theory?
- 10:30 Break
- 10:45 Graham Priest (CUNY/Melbourne), Counterfactuals and theory choice
- 12:00 Lunch: Christie Café
- 13:15 James Levine (Trinity College Dublin), Russell, set theory and the revision of logic
- 14:30 Break
- 14:45 Bruno Jacinto (Arché, St Andrews), Logic, abductive methdology and theory comparison
- 16:00 Break
- 16:15 Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill), Logical vice
Saturday 19th November
- 09:00 Morning Coffee
- 09:15 Paal Antonsen (Bergen), Truth in a model
- 10:30 Break
- 10:45 Jack Woods (Leeds), Logical partisanhood
- 12:00 Lunch: Christie Café
- 13:15 Suki Finn (Southampton), The adoption problem and self-referential logical rules
- 14:30 Break
- 14:45 Øystein Linnebo (Oslo), Ontology and the logic of identity
- 19:30 Dinner: Naboen Bar og Restaurant
If you need any assistance, please call (+47) 947 97 808 (Paal Antonsen)