Publications

List of selected publications from members of the Bergen Logic Group.

Main content

2022

Martin, B. & Hjortland, O.T. (2022). Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03653-7.
Martin, B. (2022). Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1017/can.2022.14.
Martin, B. (2022). The philosophy of logical practice. Metaphilosophy. 53(2–3): 267–283. doi: 10.1111/meta.12552.
Fjellstad, A. (2022). Expressing logical disagreement from within. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03667-1.
Huvenes, T.T. (2022). Individuation by agreement and disagreement. Inquiry. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2051203.
Commandeur, L. (2022). Against telic monism in logic. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03497-1.

2021

Øgaard, T.F. (2021). Confused entailment. Topoi. doi: 10.1007/s11245-021-09758-x.
Erickson, E. F. (2021) On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism. Principia. 25(1): 59–71. doi: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80109.
Øgaard, T.F. (2021). From Hilbert Proofs to Consecutions and Back. Australasian Journal of Logic. 18(2): 51–72. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v18i2.6770.
Øgaard, T.F. (2021). Non-Boolean Classical Relevant Logics II: Classicality through truth-constants. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03065-z.

2020

Antonsen, P. (2020). Self-Location in Interactive Fiction. The British Journal of Aesthetics. doi: 10.1093/aesthj/ayaa037.
Erickson, E. (2020). Anti-Excepcionalismo e a Metodologia da Lógica. Perspectiva Filosófica, 47(2), 502–528.
Martin, B. (2020). Introduction to the Book. In Introduction to Philosophy: Logic. (pp. 8–10).
Martin, B. (Ed.). (2020). Introduction to Philosophy: Logic. Rebus.
Martin, B. & Hjortland, O. (2020). Logical Predictivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic. doi: 10.1007/s10992-020-09566-5. Impact: Google scholar
Øgaard, T. F. (2020). Farewell to Suppression-Freedom. Logica Universalis, 14(3), 297–330. doi: 10.1007/s11787-020-00255-0.
Øgaard, T. F. (2020). Boolean negation and non-conservativity I: Relevant modal logics. Logic Journal of the IGPL, doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzaa019. Impact: Google scholar.
Øgaard, T. F. (2020). Boolean negation and non-conservativity II: The variable-sharing property. Logic Journal of the IGPL, doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzaa020. Impact: Google scholar.
Øgaard, T. F. (2020). Boolean negation and non-conservativity III: the Ackermann constant. Logic Journal of the IGPL, doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzaa021. Impact: Google scholar.
Fjellstad, A. (2020). Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘prem’. Logic and Logical Philosophy. doi: 10.12775/LLP.2020.023. Impact: Google scholar.
Fjellstad, A. (2020). Structural proof theory for first-order weak Kleene logics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2020.1782593. Impact: Google scholar.
Martin, B. (2020). Identifying Logical Evidence. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02618-y. Impact: Google scholar.

2019

Øgaard, T. F. (2019). Non-Boolean Classical Relevant Logics I. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02507-z. Impact: Google scholar
Hjortland, O. T. (2019). Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic: Introduction. Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 186. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5913.
Antonsen, P. (2019). Logical truth. Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 187–201. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5914.
Hjortland, O. T. (2019). What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory. Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 250–282. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5912. Impact: Google scholar.
Fjellstad, A. (2019). Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus. Studia Logica, 108(4), 815–855 doi: 10.1007/s11225-019-09878-x.
Fjellstad, A. (2019). A note on the cut-elimination proof in "Truth without contra(di)ction". The Review of Symbolic Logic. doi: 10.1017/S1755020319000571. Impact: Google scholar
Antonsen, P. (2019). Fictional reports. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02427-y.
Øgaard, T. F. (2019) Substitution in Relevant Logics. The Review of Symbolic Logic. 13(3), 655–680. doi: 10.1017/S1755020319000467. Impact: Google scholar
Hjortland, O. T. (2019) Disagreement about logic. Inquiry. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1651084. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2019). Relative plausibility and a prescriptive theory of evidence assessment. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 23(1–2), 1–7. doi: 10.1177/1365712718815013. Impact: Google scholar.
Martin, B. (2019). Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism. Topoi, 1–12. doi: 10.1007/s11245-019-09639-4. Impact: Google scholar

2018

Evelyn, E. (2018). Realismo lógico e a metafísica da lógica (translation). Perspectiva Filosófic, 45(1), 122–140.
Antonsen, P. (2018). Scorekeeping. Analysis, 78(4), 589–595. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx145.
Fjellstad, A. (2018). Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 7(3), 179–189. doi: 10.1002/tht3.382. Impact: Google scholar.
Hjortland, O., & Standefer, S. (2018). Inferentialism, structure, and conservativeness. In From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism (pp. 115–140). doi: 10.4324/9781315103587-6. Impact: Google scholar.
Martin, B. (2018). In defence of dialetheism: a reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 27(2), 205–233. doi: 10.12775/LLP.2017.030. Impact: Google scholar.
Martin, B. (2018). What is a Contradiction?. In Handbook of the 6th World Congress and School on Universal Logic (pp. 203–304).
Martin, B. (2018). Identifying Logical Evidence. In Handbook of the 6th World Congress and School on Universal Logic (pp. 254–256).

2017

Field, H., Lederman, H., & Øgaard, T. F. (2017). Prospects for a naive theory of classes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 58(4), 461–506. doi: 10.1215/00294527-2017-0010. Impact: Google scholar.
Fjellstad, A. (2017). Non-classical Elegance for Sequent Calculus Enthusiasts. Studia Logica, 105(1), 93–119. doi: 10.1007/s11225-016-9683-y. Impact: Google scholar.
Hjortland, O. T. (2017). Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 631–658. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0701-8. Impact: Google scholar.
Øgaard, T. F. (2017). Skolem functions in non-classical logics. Australasian Journal of Logic, 14(1), 181–225. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v14i1.4031. Impact: Google scholar.

2016

Fjellstad, A. (2016). Omega-inconsistency without cuts and nonstandard models. Australasian Journal of Logic, 13(5), 96–122. doi: 10.26686/ajl.v13i5.3900. Impact: Google scholar.
Fjellstad, A. (2016). Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(1), 65–72. doi: 10.1007/s10992-015-9351-0. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2016). Fortellinger og plausibilitet: Et svar til Frode Helmich Pedersen. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 129(4), 450–461. Impact: Google scholar.
Martin, B. (2016). Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions. Disputatio, 8(43), 253–267. doi: 10.2478/disp-2016-0015. Impact: Google scholar
Roy, O., & Hjortland, O. T. (2016). Dynamic consequence for soft information. Journal of Logic and Computation, 26(6), 1843–1864. doi: 10.1093/logcom/exu040. Impact: Google scholar.
Øgaard, T. F. (2016). Paths to triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(3), 237–276. doi: 10.1007/s10992-015-9374-6. Impact: Google scholar.

2015

Caret, C. R., & Hjortland, O. T. (Eds.). (2015). Foundations of logical consequence. OUP Oxford. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001. Impact: Google scholar
Fjellstad, A. (2015). How a semantics for tonk should be. Review of Symbolic Logic 8(3), 488–505. doi: 10.1017/S1755020314000513. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2015). En metode for bevisbedømmelsen i straffesaker. In Aarli, R., Hedlund, M.-A. & Jebens, S.E. (red.): Bevis I straffesaker: Utvalgte emner. Oslo: Gyldendal, 507–534.
Martin, B. (2015). Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(1), 61–75. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.956768. Impact: Google scholar.

2014

Hjortland, O. T. (2014). Speech acts, categoricity, and the meanings of logical connectives. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 55(4),445–467. doi: 10.1215/00294527-2798700. Impact: Google scholar.
Hjortland, O. T. (2014). Verbal disputes in logic: Against minimalism for logical connectives. Logique et Analyse, 227, 463–486. doi: 10.2143/LEA.227.0.3053514. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2014). Helheter og deler i bevisbedømmelsen. I Andersson, S. og Lainpelto, K. (red.): Festskrift til Christian Diesen. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 405–426.

2013

Hjortland, O. T. (2013). Logical pluralism, meaning-variance, and verbal disputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), 355–373. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2011.648945. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2013). Bevisbedømmelse i praksis. Fagbokforlaget. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2013). Bevis for modus operandi, og modus operandi som bevis. I Høgberg, A.P., Schea, T.E. og Torgersen, R. (red.): Rettssikker radikaler. Festskrift til Ståle Eskeland, 70 år. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 149–170.
Øgaard, T. F. (2013). Dialetheic Paths to Triviality. In Handbook of the 4th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, (pp.167–168).

2000–2012

Kolflaath, E. (2011). Bevist utover enhver rimelig tvil. Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap, 124(02), 135–196. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2011). Bevisteoretiske perspektiver. I Aarli, R., DNA-bevis. Rettssikkerhet ved bruk av DNA-sakkyndighet i kampen mot kriminalitet. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 132–160.
Kolflaath, E. (2010). Holdbarhet og relevans. I Lavik, T. & Nyvold, H. (red.): Dannelse i kontekst? ELE-tradisjonen i endring. Bergen: Institutt for filosofi og førstesemesterstudier, Universitetet i Bergen, 94–111.
Kolflaath, E. (2008). Sannsynlighetsovervekt og kumulering av tvil. Lov og Rett, 47(03), 149–165. Impact: Google Scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2007). Bevisbedømmelse som slutning til beste forklaring. Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap, 120(01–02), 171–219. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2004). Språk og argumentasjon: med eksempler fra juss. Fagbokforlaget. Impact: Google scholar.
Kolflaath, E. (2004). Bevisbedømmelse – sannsynlighet eller fortellinger? Jussens Venner, 39(5-6), 279–304. Impact: Google scholar.

Abstract of most recent article

Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection

While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional properties of logic. The picture that results is not of one singular position, but rather a cluster of often connected positions with distinct motivations, understood in terms of their rejection of clusters of the various traditional properties. In order to show the fruitfulness of this new conception of AEL, we distinguish between two prominent versions of the position, metaphysical and epistemological AEL, and show how the two positions need not stand or fall together.

Bergen Logic Group: Members

03.05.2022