Depersonalization / derealization syndrome and implicit self-consciousness

Depersonalization/derealization syndrome (DPD) is a relatively frequent psychopathological condition in which subjects feel detached from themselves, from their perceptions, emotions and actions, and from the external environment. As a testcase for theories of consciousness and self-consciousness, DPD has attracted the interest of several philosophers, who typically propose to explain DPD as a disturbance in a global, architectural feature of conscious experience such as "mineness" (Billon 2016, forthcoming; Guillot 2016) or "affective colouring" (Gerrans 2018). I criticize these accounts and work towards an alternative explanation: DPD, I submit, is as a cluster of disturbances in non-global forms of self-consciousness, which characterize the normal instances of some (but not all) types of mental states.