The Role of Experiences of Aesthetic Properties: Revisiting the Liberal View

The view that we perceptually experience aesthetic properties appears to be the predominant position in aesthetics (Hopkins, 2005; Budd, 2004, Livingstone 2003; Irvin, 2008; Iseminger, 2004; Lamarque, 2010; Sibley, 2001b; Stokes, 2014; Ransom, 2022; Wollheim, 1970, among others).

Yet surprisingly few have debated or defended this view. One reason may be its intuitive appeal: when we admire a painting, appreciate sublime nature, or listen to music, we do not seem to reason our way to the judgement that the painting is beautiful, the nature sublime, or the music powerful and soulful. Rather, these properties appear to be experienced immediately, without the need for inference.

However, there is an ongoing debate within the philosophy of perception concerning whether we perceive and experience high-level properties. According to the conservative view, perceptual experiences are limited to low-level properties such as colours, shapes, and motion. The liberal view rejects this limitation, claiming that perceptual experiences can sometimes include high-level properties such as natural and artificial kinds, affordances, and aesthetic properties. In defending the liberal view, proponents typically appeal to arguments about the nature of perceptual experience that rely, to varying degrees, on introspection.

In this paper, I focus specifically on aesthetic properties, remaining neutral on whether we sometimes experience other high-level properties. Rather than relying on introspective arguments—which arguably fail to adjudicate between these views—I examine the epistemic role that visual experiences of aesthetic properties play in forming appreciative judgements about aesthetic objects and sceneries.