Punishing Voters and Obedient Politicians? Evidence from the Norwegian Citizens Panel and the Panel of Elected Representatives

Martin Okolikj, postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Comparative Politics, will present for us today.

The event is in a hybrid format, you are welcome to join us for lunch from the Corner room at DIGSSCORE. Food is provided on a first-come first-served basis. Zoom link for digital attendance.

The talk is titled "Punishing Voters and Obedient Politicians? Evidence from the Norwegian Citizens Panel and the Panel of Elected Representatives".

Abstract:
Economic voting models rely on two key assumptions: (a) voters hold representatives accountable for their past performance and (b) elected representatives are aware that they are held accountable by voters. Rarely are these two key assumptions empirically tested for both voters and elected representatives simultaneously. Using two unique panel datasets, the Norwegian Citizens Panel and the Panel of Elected Representatives in Norway, we first assess the extent to which economic voting occurs among Norwegian citizens. We find that citizens who are dissatisfied with the state of the national economy have a higher probability to punish national incumbents in elections. Second, representatives (from the local, regional, and national levels) who believe that they are being held accountable by the voters in their constituency have a higher probability to change their positions on economic redistribution. These finding have important implications on the link between voters’ attitude to reward or punish and how that affects the congruence in policy position among elected representatives.

All are welcome!