Responsible Disagreement II
The workshop aims to explore the nature of political disagreement and the epistemic, moral, and political norms that govern such disagreement.
Main content
Disagreement among citizens in the political sphere is a persistent feature of democratic societies. This disagreement has both moral, political, and epistemic dimensions. The workshop will bring together these different perspectives in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the norms that govern political disagreement.
This is the second workshop that we are organising on this topic. The programme from the first workshop is available here (internal link).
The workshop will be preceded by a one-day master class. More information about the master class is available here (internal link).
Registration is not needed for people who are affiliated with the University of Bergen. People who are not affiliated with the University of Bergen should send an email to Torfinn Huvenes (torfinn.huvenes@uib.no) if they would like to attend the workshop.
Programme
Tuesday the 27th of May
09:15-09:30 Coffee
09:30-10:45 Jesse Tomalty (University of Bergen) and Torfinn Huvenes (University of Bergen), 'Legitimacy without Luminosity'
10:45-11:00 Break
11:00-12:15 Elizabeth Edenberg (Baruch College, CUNY), 'Misinformation and Cultivating Trust in a Politically Divided Society'
12:15-13:15 Lunch
13:15-14:30 Anthony Taylor (University of Fribourg), 'The Limits of Reasonable Disagreement'
14:30-14:45 Break
14:15-16:00 Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam), 'Against ' Reason Supremacism' in Democractic Politics'
Wednesday the 28th of May
09:15-09:30 Coffee
09:30-10:45 Michael Hannon (University of Nottingham), 'The Credentials Problem for Standpoint Theory'
10:45-11:00 Break
11:00-12:15 Jonathan Benson (University of Manchester), 'Democracy and Polarizing Speech'
12:15-13:15 Lunch
Abstracts
Torfinn Huvenes and Jesse Tomalty,’Legitimacy without Luminosity’
According to Fabienne Peter, political legitimacy cannot be grounded in normative facts. This, she argues, is because political legitimacy must always be accessible in judgment, and the normative facts are not always accessible in judgment. We argue that insofar as this accessibility objection rules out normative facts as a ground of political legitimacy, it also rules out all other grounds of political legitimacy. We should therefore not require such a demanding standard of accessibility. This opens the door to normative facts as a ground of political legitimacy. We conclude with some reflections about what this implies.
Elizabeth Edenberg, ‘Misinformation and Cultivating Trust in a Politically Divided Society’
The viral spread of misinformation poses significant challenges to political systems worldwide. The central challenge concerns the spread of false and misleading claims through a society in ways that impact people’s ability to form true beliefs, make political and personal decisions on the basis of accurate information, and act on the basis of these beliefs. Given the epistemic nature of the threat mis- and disinformation pose, many focus on epistemic solutions to this problem. I agree that these epistemic responses are important tools in our arsenal for combatting false and misleading claims, but there also are deeper moral concerns that need repair. Drawing on Rawls’s Political Liberalism, I will argue that we are best positioned to correct false beliefs and limit the damage of disinformation if we learn to trust and respect our fellow citizens across the divisions in our political community.
Anthony Taylor, 'The Limits of Reasonable Disagreement'
Political liberals hold that the exercise of political power must be made acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This view is widely thought to be vulnerable to a powerful objection: there is too little that would be acceptable to all reasonable citizens for political liberalism to provide a plausible basis for legitimate state action. I offer a new response to this challenge, which proceeds in two steps. First, I develop a distinctive interpretation of the reasonable acceptability test, which is based on the moral ideal that every citizen should be able to find her social position acceptable. Second, I use this interpretation to show that there are liberal principles of political morality that no citizen can reasonably reject.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, ‘Against “Reason Supremacism” in Democratic Politics’
Influential theorists of deliberative democracy such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls view rational argumentation as the main, and perhaps even as the only, legitimate means of deliberation in democratic societies. This general stance can be (provocatively) described as ‘reason supremacism’. However, this focus on rational argumentation tends to have exclusionary effects and to present barriers for participation especially for those at the margins of societies.
Drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young, I will argue that rational argumentation should be but one type of discourse among others in broader political conversations, thus rejecting reason supremacism in favor of a more pluralistic, inclusive conception of political discourse. To illustrate this thesis, I will present a prominent public debate that took place in the Netherlands over the last decades on the folk character known as ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet). The success of the anti-racism activism against the racialized, colonialist character of Black Pete illustrates the strength of a pluralistic approach to political discourse.
Michael Hannon, ‘The Credentials Problem for Standpoint Theory’
Standpoint theory holds that members of marginalized groups can achieve a distinctive epistemic advantage in understanding oppression. However, this advantage is not automatic—it must be earned. Some theorists argue that this achievement warrants epistemic deference from privileged groups. Yet this raises a practical problem: how can we recognize when a standpoint has actually been achieved? In this talk, I'll develop the “credentials problem” for standpoint theory. I argue that the problem challenges the feasibility of standpoint-based deference, particularly in contexts of political disagreement, and suggest that theorists should instead ground deference in the more observable epistemic advantages that arise directly from social location.
Jonathan Benson, ‘Democracy and Polarizing Speech’
Political polarization has become a central challenge confronting many contemporary democracies. While empirical analysis is crucial for understanding these trends, just as essential is a normative evaluation of polarization’s relationship to democracy. In contrast to democratic theorists who have focused on ‘group polarization’ among the public, this paper contributes to the normative assessment of polarization by analyzing the polarizing speech of political elites. Polarizing speech is conceptualized as a political strategy which aims to frame politics as a singular ‘us vs them’ conflict between exclusive and homogeneous groups. Through a deliberative systems approach, I argue that such a framing discourages varied forms of perspective-taking and reduces reflection upon reasons. As a result, polarizing speech is shown to constitute a non-deliberative exercise of power which, if widespread, can also threaten the appropriate relationship between the public sphere and more formal political institutions.